Leroy Chiao on the Augustine Commission

The scoop: The study team tasked to assess NASA's human space flight program filed its summary report on September 8. As expected, it paints a grim outlook for exploration initiatives beyond the International Space Station unless more money is put into NASA's budget. Panel member and former astronaut Leroy Chiao talks about the report and what the study panel learned with Discovery News space correspondent Irene Klotz.

Irene Klotz: The report was due Aug. 31. Why was it delayed?

Leroy Chiao: Everything we did had to be done in public. The options are out there. We finished the work on creating these option paths and briefed the White House OSTP (Office of Science & Technology Policy) and to the NASA administrator and deputy administrator on Aug. 14. As far as the actual report goes, we're cleaning things up, getting the wording right. There won't be any surprises in the report. If there were something new, some new pieces of information that we needed to talk about that might make us change a recommendation, we'd have to hold another public meeting and deliberate on it before making any changes. The delay really is a matter of us getting the report cleaned up, getting graphics pulled together and all of that.

IK: So, if there are no surprises, I guess the moon program is not going to be do-able unless there's more money?

LC: The so-called "program of record" the Constellation program (which aims to return astronauts to the moon by 2020) as constrained by the (current and projected) budget is really not very do-able. What happens is that you end up getting a heavy-lift vehicle somewhere around 2028, but you haven't had any money to even get lunar surface systems or develop a lander or a Earth-departure stage, so while that's an option, we're kind of obligated to present that as an option, it's not really a viable one.

IK: Did the committee rank the options, make prioritizations?

LC: No, our charter was to present options, executable options. In that light even the first one, the program of record constrained to the 2010 budget, you could do that. You would operate shuttle until October 2010, you would operate International Space Station to the end of 2015 and then you'd drop U.S. participation, and then you'd work on building your heavy-lift booster. But there's just not enough money to do all the things that the Constellation program wants to do. So from that standpoint, it's not a very attractive option. Our charter said that "We want you to develop options, we don't want to you make recommendations." Every committee member, I'm sure, has his or her opinion on what option will be best. We agreed that we wouldn't talk about our personal option until after the report was out and after the administration had made their decision about what direction human space flight would go.

IK: I was struck that the panel seemed to have discovered a new love and appreciation for the space station.

LC: Everyone kind of came around to say "Yeah, we really ought to keep ISS to at least 2020," and initially there were several people who said, "Well, why? It's going to suck money away and it's going to keep us from getting out of LEO (low-Earth orbit where the space station is located and where the shuttles fly). But as we looked into it more, and I've got to say being an ISS veteran I was one of the supporters of ISS, we very quickly all came to the realization ourselves and collectively that it makes a lot of sense to keep ISS. Each of the partners came in and told us that they felt strongly that ISS should keep going, should not be ended at the end of 2015. The all touted the international relations of ISS and the framework. We came to realize that this framework that has evolved, this international working relationship between all the partners, is an amazing project when you look at how many countries are involved and the scale of the construction project and the operations for it. We quickly realized that this is a great framework to use as a template for international exploration. And by extension, we also agreed that international exploration should not mean that partners cannot be in the critical path, because then they're treated as second-class citizens, which is why I think you've seen, in the past, pretty lukewarm international support for exploration.

We realized that ISS is more than an orbiting lab. In fact we even came around and agreed that we're not going to say that ISS is justified by the science that goes on onboard. Rather, the science is a nice product of the station and the fact that the station is operating. So interestingly we all came to the agreement that because of the international relationship, because of just the bettering relationships between countries through such a project, that this is a template for future exploration and future cooperation between countries, not only in space.

We also came to the realization that we could really use ISS to support exploration, support technology demonstration, technology development that will support future exploration. We're going to learn the lessons from our hardware, how to build better systems.

IK: Did the panel come up with any recommendations as far as supporting ISS? Should it continue to be a U.S.-government-backed project, or did you mention any alternative ideas, such as a semi-public agency similar to the Space Telescope Science Institute or even the Jet Propulsion Laboratory?

LC: We did have studies done to look at both the operations of ISS as well as the utilization to see if there were alternate models and maybe there might be savings in money and efficiencies that could be realized. The conclusion was that there probably was -- these were preliminary -- on both the operations and just contract consolidation, and then utilization. We really didn't have enough information to be able to say we should revive the ISS institute that was proposed a few years ago. We simply put forward that such alternative management for operations and utilization should be studied more.

IK: Did the panel decide to mention China specifically as a possible future partner for international collaborations?

LC: We certainly recognize the value of international cooperation, international relations and we called for the consideration of expanding the international partnership, even on ISS, and of course we have countries like China in mind. But that would have to be part of a bigger foreign policy package and decision. It's really not the space program that would be driving that. It would be a bigger political picture, but certainly just like what was done with Russia in 1993-1994, bringing them into the ISS program was part of a larger foreign policy decision and we've seen that that has worked quite well. Certainly there were some painful times there, but it was a big plus for the program and for the two countries. It's possible to bring China in under a similar type of model, if it fits with U.S. foreign policy and needs.

IK: Did you put together packages of options, sort of like how you'd buy a car?

LC: We kind of did. Basically there are five options with some not-so-subtle variations. Option 1 is the program of record, constrained to the 2010 budget. Option 2 is ISS and lunar exploration constrained to the 2010 budget. It extends the station (to 2020), flies out the shuttle, and then works on Ares 5 Lite; a smaller version of the Ares 5 using core heritage hardware. That was an option that would get us back to the moon in maybe late 2020s. Option 3 is our baseline case, an implemented program of record that is a modification of the Constellation program and basically would require some more money from the administration. We would de-orbit ISS in 2016, fly out the shuttle and then proceed with developing Ares 1, Ares 5 and Orion. With a budget boost, we might be able to get back to the moon in the mid 2020s.

Option 4 is what we call moon first. That option focuses on getting to the moon and also extends ISS to 2020. In variation 1 we continue flying shuttle to 2015 at a rate of maybe two per year and then we derive a heavy-lift vehicle off of shuttle -- something directly shuttle-derived. That could be side-mounted; it could be the so-called Direct (Jupiter). The second variation of that is that we would end shuttle, and then we would go ahead and develop the Ares 5 Lite. And in this option, we'd call for some money to stimulate commercial access to LEO.

Option 5 is what we call our flexible path and three are three variants of that. One is extending station to 2020, flying out the shuttle and then the three variants have to do with heavy-lift booster development: Ares 5 Lite; shuttle-derived; or evolving the expendable launch vehicle Delta 4 heavy, Atlas 5 heavy. They wouldn't be as capable as the other two -- it would take more launches to get the same amount of mass into LEO. This plan also calls for building up the infrastructure, the technology development program, to develop the capabilities to go to a NEO (near-Earth object) or something like that.

In all of these options that include exploration, our ultimate thought, our ultimate goal was Mars, but realistically you look at the different concepts of Mars Direct -- we had studies done on how much money that might take -- and the sum is so astronomical that it's just not credible for us to present that as an option, to say, "Hey, we're going to Mars and we don't care what it costs."

Our thought was "OK, we want to go to Mars. That's exciting. That's really where we ought to be heading. But recognizing that we can't afford to do it all at once right now, let's build up some infrastructure and let's build up the capability so that we go correctly, that is when we go, let's not just go there, plant a flag and have some boot prints and then we don't go again. Let's go there to sustain operations and do some meaningful work. That means two things: We need to learn how to operate a spacecraft in deep space or near-space for 100 days or 200 days, dealing with the problems like radiation and all the other problems that have to be solved, and we also have to relearn how to land on a planetary body. So for any exploration program that gets us to Mars, we've got to learn those two things. And it's a matter of whether we go to a NEO, or fly around at Lagrange (Lagrangian points of gravitational balance between bodies like the Earth and sun), or we go and land on the moon first. They're all variations on a theme.

IK: This flexible path sounds an awful lot like the original Vision for Space Exploration (as outlined by former Pres. George W. Bush following the Columbia accident investigation report) minus the moon base. It was always moon, Mars and beyond, so what's different?

LC: Both the Vision for Space Exploration and the previous Space Exploration Initiative (proposed by Bush Sr.) are very much destination driven. We're going to finish the station, we're going to go to the moon, establish a permanent presence there, and then we're going to go to Mars. It was very destination driven. What we've tried to get away from in the flexible path is defining that destination and concentrate more on capability and infrastructure. There's a technology development program that we want budget for to develop capabilities like refueling of cryogenic fuels in space, things that haven't really been demonstrated or done on a practical or large scale.

You can say that Mars is a destination, but it's really more like Mars is a goal because we're not setting a date. It's saying these are the things we need to do to build up the infrastructure to get to Mars, this is how much money we have now, and we'll see in the next several years what we think we can get done. Then it'll be for the next budget cycles after that to figure out when we might actually get to Mars.

IK: The Apollo program came about the exact opposite way. It was totally destination driven and everything that happened was the result of this single-minded goal to do this by this certain date and it was done. And as a result it sparked development of electronics industries. It made everybody want to sign up and join Starfleet Academy. It became an icon and it was totally destination driven. I guess I'm not quite understanding that if you have a program that says, "OK, boys and girls, we're going to demonstrate fuel flow in zero-G," where's the teeth?

LC: I understand. That's why we say, Mars is the goal. But for practical reasons we cannot say we're going to land by a certain date. If that date is too far out there, people aren't interested. And I think you saw that on President Bush Sr.'s SEI. "Hey we're going to landing on Mars 2029," wasn't it? When he announced it, it was far enough out there where everybody said ''Oh jeez, that's so far away, who cares. I'm not even going to think about that." So if you set the goal too far, people lose interest. If you set the goal too near, it's not practical because we don't have the money to allocate to that, to make that happen. So what are you left with?

What we did with the flexible path is say, "Well, neither one of those makes sense: We don't have the money to set the goal and if you set it too far people don't believe it and then you lose credibility, so let's just say, we want to go to Mars, we think that's what is going to inspire, but we're not going to set a date. Because we can't. We don't have enough information to set a date. We don't know what the budget numbers are going too look like in the out years. So let's build the infrastructure, and admittedly that's not as exciting as saying, "Hey, we're going to land on the moon in nine years, as President Kennedy did back in 1961."

What do you do? Even going back to the moon -- you heard (former NASA Administrator) Mike Griffin say we're going back to the moon and we're going there to stay and frankly the country was kind of bored with that. You had a lot of people say, "Why are we doing that? We've already been there." And that's a shame, but that's a fact.

The other way to look at the moon also is well, if we announce that we're going to go to the moon and that's our goal and then somebody beats us back, boy we sure look kind of foolish, don't we? We landed on the moon over 40 years ago and we can't even get back there before somebody else does. Really, we should be partnering internationally, in this international framework that I talked about, to go to the moon to use the moon as a test bed, to develop the technologies on ISS and in Earth-orbit or maybe around a Lagrange point to do some of these high-technology demonstrations, building up the infrastructure to go to Mars together.

I don't think we're ever getting back to the way things were in the early '60s, the excitement of the space race, because that's what it was all about -- beating the Soviets to the moon, showing our technological superiority and all of that. I don't think we'll see that again because Mars is such a more difficult problem and such a more expensive problem. We can't say "Hey we're going to go to Mars in 10 years" because the money is not there to do that.

IK: Sounds like you all think it's time for NASA to act like a 50-year-old instead of a kid.

LC: Well, the big problem is that NASA -- admirably -- always tries to do too much with too little and one of our big messages is "Hey, we've got to knock that off," because what you end up doing is you end up putting all your money into development costs for your hardware and then pushing off, saying we'll always get the operations money, and what you end up with is a system that costs a whole lot to operate because you didn't have that much money and you put it all into developing the hardware and you didn't care about what the implications were for the operating costs. We're trying to send that message to turn this around. Future vehicles, future hardware we've got to take into account operating costs and try to figure out how to bring those down because that's what kills the program. That's why we're having such difficulty running station and shuttle and then trying to do a development program for Constellation. Because shuttle and station really take a lot of money to operate because of the way they're designed. That's the problem. Then we're faced with terminating mature running programs to try to do development and that's when we end up with these gaps. We had a gap between Apollo and shuttle and we're going to have another gap here pretty soon.

IK: So, at the end of the day, in spite of seemingly insurmountable odds, you guys managed to thread the needle?

LC: I think we're pretty happy with the options we came up with and they were well received by (President Obama's) science advisor and the NASA administrator. They were both cautiously optimistic that we might be able to get a little bit of funding bump to help realize some of these things. They're also free to mix-and-match. They don't have to choose the option path that we laid out. They can choose some from each, and kind of create their own option package. We're all cautiously optimistic that we'll see some bold strokes in a new human space flight program.